Equivalence of SIM-CCA and IND-CCA
From CRYPTUTOR
SIM-CCA is a stronger definition in secrecy than IND-CCA.
SIM-CCA
IND-CCA
- Suppose not IND-CCA, therefore,
, for the IND-CCA experiment with non-negligible advantage.
- Construct Env* and Adv* such that
Sim,
where
is negligible.
IND-CCA adversary:
- Env picks
.
- If Adv asks for encryption, Env sends to Alice, and Alice gives to Adv.
- If Adv asks for decryption, Env(or oracle for IND) sends to Bob, and Bob gives to Adv.
- If Bob sends to Env the decryption of the ciphertext received from Alice, Env ignores it by not sending the decryption to Adv. Otherwise (ciphertext is not from Alice), Env sends
to Adv.
- Adv guesses and sends
to Env.
- Env outputs z, where z=1 if Adv guesses correctly (b=b'), z=0 otherwise.
In REAL, Adv in IND-CCA experiment,
In IDEAL,
Putting the two together,
Suppose SIM-CCA is not IND-CCA, then
in IND-CCA experiment with non-negligible advtg. Then consider Env* and adversary A* as above, then
which is non-negligible. This contradicts our definition of SIM-CCA.
IND-CCA
SIM-CCA
Given IND-CCA scheme, for any Adv A, construct simulator
:
Claim:
A, this Simulator
Env is "good":
Proof: Suppose not
A, Env, then build A* for IND-CCA such that advtg A in IND-CCA =
'
SimAlice: Whenever Env sends
to IdealAlice, SimAlice gets
(dummy message).
SimBob: Does not send to Env if
was received from Simulator Adversary because IdealAlice already sent to IdealBob.
The filter in the Simulator between A and SimBob ignores dummy message encryptions (ie. SimBob does not send the encryption to IdealBob).
If b=1, IND-CCA experiment is identical to REAL with Env and A.
If b=0, IND-CCA experiment is identical to IDEAL with Env and
.
Advtg of A*




